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Judge Rubin and the Death Penalty: Legacy
Unaccomplished
David J. Bradford*
There are few areas of jurisprudence which can take a finer measure
of a jurist than his work in death penalty cases; the stakes are life and
death and the temptation to reach results which reflect personal ideology
are high. Judge Rubin's death penalty opinions are restrained and nonresult-oriented. They reflect his extraordinary intellectual integrity, his
overriding respect for the adversarial process, and his frustration with
the constraints of Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit precedent.
Judge Rubin wrote opinions addressing sixteen different habeas corpus petitions in death penalty cases.' In three of them, he wrote a
majority opinion granting relief to the condemned, 2 one of which was
reversed en banc by the court of appeals.3 In each of his other thirteen
cases, the court denied relief to the condemned petitioner.4 In three of
those cases, Judge Rubin concurred in the court's judgment because he

Copyright 1992, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
Counsel-Director for the MacArthur Justice Center in Chicago. 1976 cum laude
graduate of the University of Chicago Law School. Clerk for Judge Rubin in 1976 through
1978.
1. The death penalty arises in federal court almost exclusively in the context of
federal habeas corpus cases, in which only federal constitutional claims can be raised. 28
U.S.C. § 2254 (1988). Few federal cases have been decided under recently enacted legislation
providing a federal death penalty for certain crimes. 21 U.S.C. § 848(e) (1988). See U.S.
v. Cooper, 754 F. Supp. 617 (N.D. Il1. 1990) (upholding constitutionality of the federal
statute).
2. King v. Lynaugh, 828 F.2d 257, reversed en banc, 850 F.2d 1055 (5th Cir. 1988);
Mayo v. Lynaugh, 893 F.2d 683, modified, 920 F.2d 251 (5th Cir. 1990); Wilson v.
Butler, 813 F.2d 669, modified, 825 F.2d 879 (5th Cir. 1987).
3. King v. Lynaugh, 850 F.2d 1055 (5th Cir. 1988) (en banc).
4. Baldwin v. Maggio, 715 F.2d 152 (5th Cir. 1983); Byrne v. Butler, 845 F.2d 501,
519 (5th Cir. 1988) (Rubin, J., concurring); Jones v. Butler, 864 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1988);
Thompson v. Lynaugh, 821 F.2d 1054 (5th Cir. 1987); Kirkpatrick v. Butler, 870 F.2d
276 (5th Cir. 1989); King v. Lynaugh, 868 F.2d 1400, 1406 (5th Cir. 1989) (Rubin, J.,
concurring); Landry v. Lynaugh, 844 F.2d 1117 (5th Cir. 1988); Mayo v. Lynaugh, 882
F.2d 134, modified, 883 F.2d 358 (5th Cir. 1989), reversed, 893 F.2d 683, modified, 920
F.2d 251 (5th Cir. 1990); Riles v. McCotter, 799 F.2d 947, 955 (5th Cir. 1986) (Rubin,
J., concurring); Wicker v. McCotter, 783 F.2d 487 (5th Cir. 1986); together with the
cases set forth infra note 6.
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5
was compelled to do6 so by precedent with which he disagreed; in four
others, he dissented.
Section I of this article discusses the general constitutional framework
within which Judge Rubin worked in death penalty cases. Sections II
through VI focus on his opinions on five issues that were raised with
some frequency in the Fifth Circuit during his tenure: (a) whether the
Texas death penalty law unconstitutionally precluded the sentencer from
giving effect to mitigating evidence; (b) whether counsel violated the
Sixth Amendment standards for ineffective assistance at the sentencing
hearing; (c) whether the jury's deliberative process was unconstitutionally
infected by the misconception that the defendant would be eligible for
parole if he was not sentenced to die; (d) whether the defendant was
entitled to a stay of execution or further process; and (e) whether a
death sentence imposed under the Louisiana death penalty law was
unconstitutional when one, but not all, of the statutory aggravating
factors on which it was based was invalid.

I.

THE CONSTITUTIoNAL FRAMEWORK

In 1972, the United States Supreme Court held the Georgia death
penalty law unconstitutional because it allowed unbridled discretion in
7
determining who should live and who should die. This unguided discretion resulted in the arbitrary and capricious application of the death
penalty in violation of the Eighth Amendment.'
Subsequent to Furman, the Supreme Court upheld three state death
penalty laws which limited the sentencer's discretion and prevented arbitrariness, by conditioning a death sentence upon proof of a statutory
aggravating factor. 9 However, in two companion cases, the Supreme
Court held that two state death penalty laws, which made death mandatory when certain aggravating factors were proved, had gone too far
0
in their effort to address the constitutional concerns of Furman. These
statutory schemes were unconstitutional because they did not allow the
jury to make an individualized sentencing decision based upon any
mitigating evidence."

5. Byrne, 845 F.2d at 519; King, 868 F.2d at 1406; Riles, 799 F.2d at 955.
6. Griffin v. Lynaugh, 823 F.2d 856, 865 (5th Cir. 1987) (Rubin, J., dissenting);
Buxton v. Lynaugh, 879 F.2d 140, 148 (5th Cir. 1989) (Rubin, J., dissenting); Kirkpatrick
v. Blackburn, 777 F.2d 272, 288 (5th Cir. 1985) (Rubin, J., dissenting); King, 850 F.2d
at 1061 (Rubin, J., dissenting).
7. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S. Ct. 2726 (1972).
8. Id.
9. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S. Ct. 2909 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S.
262, 96 S. Ct. 2950 (1976); and Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 96 S. Ct. 2960 (1976).
10. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 96 S. Ct. 2978 (1976); Roberts v.
Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 96 S. Ct. 3001 (1976).
11. Id.
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The decisions in Gregg and its companion cases established two
limited constitutional principles, which provide the framework for analyzing the constitutionality of any state death penalty scheme. First,
the group of defendants eligible for the death penalty must be narrowed
to those cases in which the state has proved an objective statutory
aggravating factor which "channel[s] the sentencer's discretion. ' "'2 Second, to ensure that the sentencing decision is individualized, the sentencer
may not be prevented from considering and giving effect to any mitigating circumstances regarding the defendant or his crime. 3
II.

THE

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE TEXAS DEATH PENALTY LAW

Judge Rubin wrote opinions in three cases in which the defendant
complained that the Texas death penalty law unconstitutionally precluded
the jury from giving effect to mitigating evidence. The decisions reflect
Judge Rubin's open-minded and restrained approach to deciding constitutional issues. They also reflect that whether an attorney raises a
claim in strict accordance with state procedure can determine arbitrarily
who lives and who dies.
In Jurek,'4 the United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Texas death penalty scheme against the claim that it
permitted the arbitrary imposition of the death penalty. It found that
Texas adequately channeled the jury's discretion by mandating death
whenever the jury answered three "special issues" affirmatively." But
it upheld the Texas scheme on the premise that these statutory questions
would be construed in a manner that would allow for adequate consideration of mitigating evidence. 6
For a number of years the Fifth Circuit, relying on Jurek, routinely
rejected claims that the Texas scheme did not adequately permit the
jury to give effect to mitigating circumstances. '7 For example, in Thompson v. Lynaugh,8 Judge Rubin found the Texas special issue instructions

12. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428, 100 S. Ct. 1759, 1764 (1980).
13. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604, 98 S. Ct. 2954, 2964 (1978).
14. 428 U.S. 262, 96 S. Ct. 2950 (1976).
15. The Texas special issues are: (1)whether the conduct of the defendant that caused
the death of the deceased was committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation
that the death of the deceased or another would result; (2) whether there is a probability
that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society; and (3) if raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of the
defendant in killing the deceased was unreasonable in response to the provocation, if any,
by the deceased. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 37.071 (Vernon Supp. 1987).
16. 428 U.S. at 272, 96 S. Ct. at 2956.
17. See e.g., Penry v. Lynaugh, 882 F.2d 141 (5th Cir. 1987), reversed, 492 U.S.
302, 109 S. Ct. 2934 (1989).
18. 821 F.2d 1054, 1059 (5th Cir. 1987).
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had "been construed to allow a defendant to introduce, during the
punishment phase of his trial, whatever mitigating evidence he can
muster, thus ensuring that a death sentence is not 'wontonly or freak9
ishly' applied." Thirteen years after Jurek, in Penry v. Lynaugh,1 the
Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit and recognized that the Texas
scheme unconstitutionally prevented the jury from giving effect to certain
mitigating evidence.
In Landry v. Lynaugh, a case decided a year before the United
States Supreme Court had granted certiorari in Penry, Landry raised
the Penry claim, i.e. that the Texas "death penalty scheme does not
20
permit the jury to give full consideration to mitigating circumstances. "
Because Landry's counsel failed to object to the Texas statute on this
ground at trial, the district court found the claim barred under the
procedural default doctrine of Wainwright v. Sykes. 2' Landry contended
that the jurisprudential novelty of his Penry claim should excuse his
default. 22 Judge Rubin rejected the "novelty" argument because the
2
Fifth Circuit had done so in Selvage v. Lynaugh. 1 Judge Rubin also
found that the United States Supreme Court had left open the question
of whether the Texas death penalty law allowed for adequate consideration of mitigating circumstances in its 1976 decision in Jurek; thus,
there had been a reasonable basis to raise the claim at the time of
Landry's trial in 1983.24

Within a year of his decision in Landry, Judge Rubin revisited the
question of whether counsel's failure to raise a Penry claim at trial
25
should be barred by procedural default in King v. Lynaugh. By this
time, the Supreme Court had granted certiorari but not yet ruled in
Penry. The court in King issued a per curiam opinion concluding that
it was bound by Selvage to find the Penry claim was defaulted because
counsel failed to raise it at trial.
Judge Rubin exemplified his open-minded quest for accuracy and
departed from his opinion in Landry. He wrote a concurring opinion
concluding that the Penry claim should not be barred by procedural
default. Contrary to his opinion in Landry, he found that prior to
26
Selvage, the Fifth Circuit had decided in Williams v. Lynaugh that a

19. 492 U.S. 302, 109 S. Ct. 2934 (1989).
20. 844 F.2d 1117, 1122 (5th Cir. 1988).
21. 433 U.S. 72, 97 S. Ct. 2497 (1977).
22. See Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1,14-15, 104 S. Ct. 2901, 2909-10 (1984).
23. 842 F.2d 89, 94-95 (5th Cir. 1988).
24. 844 F.2d at 1122.
25. 868 F.2d 1400 (5th Cir. 1989) (King III) (Rubin, J.,concurring). This opinion,
was Judge Rubin's opinion concerning Leon
which concurred in the denial of relief
Rutherford King. See infra note 59 and accompanying text.
26. 837 F.2d 1294 (5th Cir. 1988).
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Penry claim should not be barred by procedural default. Because Williams was the earliest decision on the issue, Judge Rubin concluded that
the court was compelled to follow it. However, he recognized the court
was also obligated to follow the court of appeals' decision in Penry on
the merits and deny relief.
In Mayo v. Lynaugh, 7 Judge Rubin addressed the merits of the
Penry claim, through four separate decisions. In his first opinion in
Mayo, Judge Rubin rejected the Penry claim on the merits because he
was still "bound by the precedents of this circuit," including Penry
itself.' 8
Within days of Mayo I, the Supreme Court issued its decision in
Penry, overturning the Fifth Circuit and finding that at least in some
cases the Texas statute unconstitutionally precluded the jury from giving
effect to mitigating evidence. The State now argued that Mayo, like
Landry and King before him, had procedurally forfeited his Penry claim
by failing to raise it at trial. The panel initially agreed, citing Judge
Rubin's concurring opinion in King III39 It also concluded that even
if the Penry claim had been preserved, Mayo had not explained how
his jury was precluded from giving effect to mitigating evidence.10
Mayo filed a second rehearing petition, contending that the State
had waived its procedural default defense by failing to raise it in the
federal district court. Judge Rubin again demonstrated his open-minded
approach even as to the correctness of his own opinions and agreed
with Mayo that the state had waived any procedural default defense.,'
He also reasoned that because a Penry claim focused on the mitigating
evidence presented at sentencing, the failure to make a contemporaneous
objection did not impair the court's ability to analyze the claim in
collateral proceedings.3 2 Finally, he found the Texas special issues instruction did not provide a vehicle for the jury to consider the mitigating
evidence of child abuse in Mayo's case. 3 Reflecting his never-ending
quest for accuracy, Judge Rubin thereafter issued yet a fourth opinion3 4
modifying his discussion of the mitigating evidence in Mayo's case.
It was only a series of fortuities-the State's failure to raise a timely
procedural default defense and the timing of the Supreme Court's opinion
in Penry-thatallowed Judge Rubin to analyze the constitutional merits

27. 882 F.2d 134, modified, 883 F.2d 358 (5th Cir. 1989), reversed, 893 F.2d 683,
modified, 920 F.2d 251 (5th Cir. 1990).
28. 882 F.2d at 140-41 (Mayo 1).
29. King, 868 F.2d at 1406.
30. 883 F.2d at 360 (Mayo 11).
31. 893 F.2d at 686 (Mayo I1).

32. Id.at 689-90.
33. Id.at 688.
34. Mayo v. Collins, 920 F.2d 251 (5th Cir. 1990).
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in Mayo, but not in Landry and King III. More importantly, however,
it was only because of Judge Rubin's intellectual integrity and willingness
to reconsider his own post-Penry decision, that Mayo was afforded
relief.
III.

INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

Judge Rubin was renown for setting high standards of professionalism, particularly in his own courtroom. His opinions on whether
counsel in death penalty cases violated the Sixth Amendment standards
for effective assistance of counsel, however, do not reflect those standards. Rather, they reflect his adherence to the Supreme Court opinion
in Strickland v. Washington" which tolerates substantial incompetence.
Nonetheless, Judge Rubin's eloquent comments on the capricious effects
of the Strickland standard are an enduring, albeit dissenting, contribution
to death penalty jurisprudence.
Judge Rubin recognized that under the Supreme Court standard in
Strickland,36 "counsel is not so ineffectual . . . unless [he] made errors
so egregious that he was not functioning as the 'counsel' . . . guaranteed
by the Sixth Amendment . . . . -37 Additionally, under Strickland, "proof

that the lawyer was ineffective requires proof not only that the lawyer
38
bungled but also that his errors likely affected the result."
Applying these standards, Judge Rubin rejected a number of ineffective assistance of counsel claims. In Wicker,39 he found that counsel
did not violate the Strickland standard even though he failed to disqualify
a juror who was "not certain" he could follow the law, failed to voir
dire on pre-trial publicity, failed to obtain proper instructions from the
court, and called as defense witnesses two doctors who testified that
Wicker's violent behavior would increase rather than abate.
In Kirkpatrick v. Butler, 40 he denied relief under Strickland because
even if counsel had acted within the "wide range of professionally
competent assistance," the result likely would not have been different.
Judge Rubin recognized the limited standards by which a claim of
ineffective assistance must be measured under Strickland:
In the trial of lawsuits, as in war, victory finds a thousand
fathers, defeat is an orphan. It is always possible to conjecture
that defense counsel could have done more .

.

. and that these

additional efforts might have altered the result. That is not,

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984).
Id.
Wicker v. McCotter, 783 F.2d 487, 494 (5th Cir. 1986).
Riles v. McCotter, 799 F.2d 947, 955 (5th Cir. 1986) (Rubin, J., concurring).
783 F.2d at 494-97.
870 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1989).
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however, the standard under which we review counsel's conduct.
Although counsel's arguments failed to persuade [they] ... do
not indicate that counsel's performance was "outside the wide
range of professionally competent assistance." '4,
In Riles v. McCotter, 42 Judge Rubin once again found that the
Strickland standards compelled him to concur in a judgment that counsel
was not incompetent. However, his acquiescence did not preclude him
from delivering an eloquent and compelling opinion:
I concur in the opinion because, as a judge of an inferior court,
I am bound by the decision of the Supreme Court, and, as a
judge of this court, I am bound by the law of this circuit. If
I were free to do so, I would order an evidentiary hearing on
the effectiveness of counsel ....
The record, indicate[s] that,
if Riles' trial counsel had been able, the jury might not have
imposed the death penalty.
The Constitution, as interpreted by the courts, does not require
that the accused, even in a capital case, be represented by able
or effective counsel. It requires representation only by a lawyer
who is not ineffective under the standards set by Strickland v.
Washington.
Judge Rubin concluded, "accused persons who are represented by
'not-legally-ineffective' lawyers may be condemned to die when the same
accused, if represented by effective counsel, would receive at least a
'43
clemency of a life sentence."
The logic of Judge Rubin's concurrence in Riles is undeniable. The
Supreme Court standard in Strickland allows a person's life to be taken
solely because his counsel was not effective. The result of the Strickland
standard and of allowing counsel's procedural defaults to determine
when a constitutional violation may be remedied," produce a system in
which the imposition of the death penalty is no less arbitrary than that
which the Court condemned in Furman.

41. 870 F.2d at 285, quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. 668, 690, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2066
(1984). In two cases, discussed in Section VI below, Judge Rubin wrote opinions in favor
of remanding a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for an evidentiary hearing in
the district court. Wilson v. Butler, 813 F.2d 664, modified, 825 F.2d 879 (5th Cir. 1987);
Buxton v. Lynaugh, 879 F.2d 140, 148 (5th Cir. 1989) (Rubin, J., dissenting). On both
occasions, he sought to remand not because counsel was necessarily ineffective under
Strickland, but because the district court had failed even to hear evidence on the issue.
42. 799 F.2d 947, 955 (5th Cir. 1986) (Rubin, J., concurring).
43. Id. (emphasis in original).
44. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
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MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT PAROLE: WHETHER THE JURY'S DECISION
Is

BASED ONLY ON AGGRAVATING AND MITIGATING

FACTORS

While Judge Rubin expressed his disagreements with the Strickland
standard in concurring opinions, he openly dissented in two Fifth Circuit
decisions in which the death penalty was based upon misconception and
45
bias. In Kirkpatrick v. Blackburn, Judge Rubin dissented from an
opinion upholding a death sentence because the prosecutor's closing
argument distracted the jury from its "focus on the aggravating and
mitigating circumstances of the crime." Judge Rubin returned to the
most fundamental concern of Furman: "Because death is so fundamentally different from other kinds of punishment, the Constitution
requires, by means of procedural safeguards and judicial vigilance, assurance that the imposition of death is not the product of arbitrariness
and caprice."46 Because the prosecutor undermined the jury's ability "to
mitigating factors of the case,"
weigh dispassionately the aggravating and
47
the death sentence should not stand.
In King v. Lynaugh, 48 Judge Rubin founded his respective majority
and dissenting opinions on the same principle. King complained that he
was entitled to a jury instruction concerning the minimum duration of
a life sentence in Texas and to voir dire potential jurors on whether
they believed that a defendant would be released on early parole if he
was not sentenced to death. Judge Rubin wrote a majority opinion
denying relief on King's jury instruction claim, but granting relief on
the related voir dire claim.
Judge Rubin rejected the instruction claim because he was con49
strained to do so by O'Bryan v. Estelle, in which the Fifth Circuit
held that a capital defendant is not entitled to an instruction about the
availability vel non of parole. Judge Rubin noted that O'Bryan could
be distinguished because it addressed only a due process claim, whereas
King raised a distinct constitutional basis for his claim under the Eighth
Amendment. Judge Rubin reasoned that under the Eighth Amendment,
"alternative sentences and what, in reality, they mean, constitute ...
an integral part of the calculus sentencers use to determine whether a
life sentence will suffice to ensure that a particular defendant, convicted
50
Noneof a particular crime, will pose a continued threat to society."

45.
46.

777 F.2d 272, 288 (5th Cir. 1985) (Rubin, J., dissenting).
Id.

47.

Id.

48. 828 F.2d 257 (5th Cir. 1987) (King 1), reversed, 850 F.2d 1055 (5th Cir. 1988)
(en banc) (King Ii) (Rubin, J., dissenting).
49. 714 F.2d 365, 388-89 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub. nor O'Bryan v. McKaskle,
465 U.S. 1013, 104 S. Ct. 1015 (1984).
50. 828 F.2d at 263.
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theless, Judge Rubin once again exercised judicial restraint and concluded
that he should not base a decision on the Eighth Amendment that would
be "fundamentally inconsistent" with the result in O'Bryan.5'
However, because O'Bryan precluded an instruction to correct misconceptions about parole, Judge Rubin concluded that a defendant should
be entitled to voir dire on whether potential jurors held these misconceptions. 2 He recognized that the "widely held misconceptions about
the actual effect of imposing a life sentence raise an unacceptable risk
that the death penalty may be imposed on some defendants largely on
the basis of mistaken notions of parole law."" a
Less than a year later, Judge Rubin's opinion in King was overruled,
by the court of appeals en banc. 4 The court's en banc opinion, as do
many opinions denying relief in death penalty appeals, began by vividly
recounting the murder. It posited that there was "considerable mischief"
in allowing voir dire on Texas parole eligibility when "Texas disallows
jury consideration of the possibility of parole in its deliberations." 5
Judge Rubin began his dissenting opinion:
That Leon Rutherford King is a savage criminal has been proved
beyond reasonable doubt. Yet even he is entitled to due process
when society imposes its sentence on him.5 6
Judge Rubin recounted empirical evidence establishing that most venirepersons believe that a defendant who is sentenced to life will be paroled
in seven years and that parole eligibility is a critical factor in deciding
whether to impose a death sentence.5 7 Indeed, when venirepersons are
accurately informed that "life means life," a majority no longer favor
the death penalty.5

51. Id. at 264.
52. Id. at 261.
53. Id. at 260. In addressing the importance of eliminating misconceptions about
parole from the life or death deliberative process, Judge Rubin recognized that death
cases require a "greater degree of scrutiny" than a non-capital case. King 1, 828 F.2d
at 259, quoting California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 998-99, 103 S. Ct. 3446, 3452 (1983).
Because capital juries are called upon to make a highly subjective, unique, individualized
judgment regarding the punishment that a particular person deserves, there is a "unique
opportunity ...

for bias to operate undetected."

Id.

54. King v. Lynaugh, 850 F.2d 1055 (5th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (King II).
55. Id. at 1067.
56. Id. at 1061.
57. Id. at 1062. Anthony Paduano & Clive A. Stafford Smith, Deathly Errors: Juror's
Misconception Concerning Parole and the Imposition of the Death Penalty, 18 Colum.
Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 211 (1987); William W. Hood, III, Note, The Meaning of "Life"
for Virginia Jurors and Its Effect on Reliability of Capital Sentencing, 75 Va. L. Rev.
1605 (1989).
58. 850 F.2d at 1062.
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Judge Rubin found the majority opinion could not be reconciled
with Supreme Court opinions promising "extraordinary measures to
ensure that the prisoner sentenced to be executed is afforded process
that will guarantee, as much as is humanly possible, that the sentence
was not imposed out of ... mistake." 5' 9 He saw "greater mischief" in
allowing a defendant to be sentenced to die because the jury misunderstood what a life sentence meant. °
He also reasoned that because Texas makes a defendant's future
dangerousness a specific statutory issue in deciding whether to sentence
him to die, the relevance of his possible release date as mitigating
information "hardly seems disputable." ' 6' Turning the majority opinion
on its head, Judge Rubin wrote, "It is precisely because Texas courts
refuse to give accurate corrective instructions that voir dire about potential jurors understanding of parole becomes necessary. '"62
Judge Rubin's dissent in King 11 shines in the annals of dissenting
opinions. His intellectual integrity and allegiance to precedent, including
his adherence to O'Bryan in King I, only make his dissent in King II
63
more compelling.
V.

STAYS OF EXECUTION,

FINALITY AND FURTHER PROCESS

Federal habeas has served as an important check against the imposition of the death penalty in violation of the Constitution. Notwithstanding the conservative composition of the federal courts, over forty
percent of all death sentences have been overturned in federal habeas
proceedings, often due to the most egregious constitutional violations.6
In response, however, the Rehnquist Supreme Court systematically has
erected barriers to habeas review which make counsel's failures to raise
claims the primary determinant of which defendants are eligible to
vindicate their federal constitutional rights.65 The Court's decisions have

59. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 118, 102 S. Ct. 869, 878 (1982) (O'Connor,
J., concurring).

60. 850 F.2d at 1067.
61. Id. at 1066.
62. Id. at 1067 (emphasis in original).
63. In Byrne v. Butler, 845 F.2d 501, 519 (5th Cir. 1988) (Rubin, J.,concurring),
Judge Rubin distinguished his opinion in King II and concurred in denying relief to a
defendant who complained about jurors' misconceptions about parole eligibility because
both a jury's instructions and a counsel's arguments clarified to the jury that "life meant
life."
64. Mark Hansen, Final Justice: Limiting Death Row Appeals, A.B.A Journal (March
1992) at 68.
65. See McKleskey v. Zant, Ill S. Ct. 1454 (1991), where the Court closed the
federal habeas process to constitutional violations not raised by counsel in an initial habeas
petition, even though evidence of the violation was concealed by the state. In Coleman
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placed an extraordinary value on finality and on conserving federal
judicial resources.
Judge Rubin was mindful that federal judicial resources were precious. In Baldwin v. Maggio,66 over the dissent of Judge Johnson, he
denied a stay of execution that was based on the prospect that the
United States Supreme Court would issue opinions helpful to Baldwin
in the then undecided cases of Strickland v. Washington6 7 and Pulley
6
v. Harris.
1 Judge Rubin found that Baldwin's case could not be helped
even by decisions favorable to him in Strickland and Harris.69 He concluded that the principles of Barefoot v. Estelle7 ° required that the process
of federal review must end based only on a calculated improbability of
success.
As a co-chair of the American Bar Association Task Force on Death
Penalty Habeas Corpus, Judge Rubin oversaw one of the most comprehensive reviews of the capital habeas process. His Task Force made
recommendations that would dramatically improve the habeas process.
He recognized, even in that context, that the federal review process and
the defendant's life must come to an end, often without full opportunity
for Supreme Court review:
It is a matter of common occurrence that the district courts in
[the Fifth Circuit] are presented with applications for stay of
execution-frequently very lengthy and complex-two weeks or
less before the execution date, and the case comes to our court
on appeal from a denial of a stay and from the denial of habeas
relief one or two days before the date set for execution. The
judges of our court make a major effort to decide those cases
in which we deny relief in time to give the petitioner a chance
to present its case to the Supreme Court. Frequently, in order
to do so, the members of the panel and the law clerks work
on weekends and late into the night [as do district judges]. The
problem is not that we have to put in the extra time: it is that

v. Thompson, III S. Ct. 2546 (1991), it also precluded constitutional claims not raised
in state court solely due to counsel's neglect in missing a state deadline for filing a notice
of appeal. It then held that counsel's neglect in missing the deadline to appeal was not
ineffective assistance, because there was no right to an effective attorney in state postconviction proceedings.
66. 715 F.2d 152 (5th Cir. 1983).
67. 466 U.S. 668 (1983), 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984).
68. 465 U.S. 37, 104 S. Ct. 871 (1983). In Strickland, the state sought a stringent
standard for evaluating the effectiveness of counsel in capital cases. In Harris,the petitioner
argued for a constitutional requirement that a state supreme court provide proportionality
review by comparing death sentences in different cases to reduce arbitrariness.
69. The Supreme Court ultimately adopteo the state's position in both Strickland and
Harris, and later denied Baldwin's certiorari petition as well.
70. 463 U.S. 880, 103 S. Ct. 3383 (1983).
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work done in this manner is necessarily less thorough and that
the time allowed for the consideration of issues is less than is
desirable. The easy answer, which opponents of the death penalty
suggest, is, "the defendant isn't going anywhere. Why not stay
the execution and take your time?" However, when the case
has already been in court five to ten years or more and there
have been two or three previous stays of execution, it seems to
be undesirable to grant another stay unless there is some serious
legal reason to do so. Moreover, in many instances, the panel
is of the opinion that granting a stay "this time," will lead
only to another eve-of-execution application on some other ground
at a later time.7
But in contrast to Supreme Court decisions which allow a client to
pay with his life for his counsel's mistakes, Judge Rubin sought to
balance the interests of finality with a fundamental concern that the
habeas process serve to remedy constitutional violations, particularly in
death penalty cases. In Wilson v. Butler,72 Judge Rubin remanded for
an evidentiary hearing on Wilson's claim that his appointed counsel was
ineffective at sentencing. Wilson had alleged that, although he was braindamaged, his counsel never investigated his history of mental problems,
never had him examined psychologically, and presented no evidence of
his mental impairment at sentencing even though it was a statutory
mitigating factor."
In Wilson II, over -Judge Jones' dissent, Judge Rubin expanded the
scope of the evidentiary hearing on remand to include the issue of
whether counsel was also ineffective at trial for not investigating and
presenting an insanity defense. Judge Rubin recognized that Wilson had
failed to allege facts sufficient to establish ineffective assistance of
counsel at the guilt phase,7 4 and that dismissal of his ineffectiveness-attrial claim was appropriate." However, he found "several factors unique
to this case" warranted that the district court consider the issue of
ineffective assistance at trial. First, the claims of ineffective assistance
at trial and at sentencing were both based on essentially the same
evidence; thus consideration of the additional issue would "consume few
if any additional resources." ' 76 Second, "any additional federalism con-

71. Letter from Judge Rubin (Jan. 16, 1989) at 2-3, quoted in "Rationalizing Federal
Habeas Corpus Review of State Court Criminal Convictions in Capital Cases," Background
and Issue Papers (ABA Task Force on Death Penalty Habeas Corpus, May 1, 1989).
72. 813 F.2d 664 (Wilson 1), modified, 825 F.2d 879 (5th Cir. 1987) (Wilson 1).
73. 813 F.2d at 664.
74. 825 F.2d at 881.
75. Judge Rubin's opinion in Wilson H reflects an appreciation for the importance
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cern caused by expanding the scope of the inquiry, but not the scope
of the evidence, at the hearing would be minimal. '77 Third, the State
had "no legitimate interest in preventing a remedy" of any constitutional
78
violation which occurred at trial.
Ultimately, Judge Rubin recognized "[t]he essential purpose of federal habeas corpus is to insure that no petitioner is punished in violation
of the Constitution. ' 79 Particularly "[w]hen, . . . the punishment involved is death, a punishment qualitatively different from all others,
fundamental justice demands heightened vigilance in evaluating a petitioner's constitutional claims." ' 0 Judge Rubin reasoned, "if death is
involved, the petitioner should be presented every opportunity possible,
consistent with the interest of the State, to present facts relevant to his
constitutional claims."
Judge Rubin's decisions in Wilson II and Baldwin thoughtfully
balanced the value of remedying a constitutional injustice in death penalty
cases with the state's interest in finality and comity. His careful balancing
of interests is in sharp contrast to Supreme Court decisions which tilt
the scales in favor of terminating the habeas process and the defendant's
life whenever constitutional violations are not raised promptly by counseleven ineffective counsel. 81
VI.

INvALID AGGRAVATING FACTORS UNDER LOUISIANA LAW

Judge Rubin addressed the first of these principles in several cases
in which a Louisiana jury found the defendant eligible for the death
penalty based on multiple aggravating factors, some but not all of which
were later invalidated.82 His opinions adhered to the constraints of state
law and federal precedent with intellectual ferocity.
In Wilson v. Butler,83 the jury found the defendant was qualified
for the death penalty based on three independent statutory aggravating
factors only one of which was valid.1 Wilson argued that the jury was

of the adversarial process, which he also articulated in his dissenting opinion in Buxton
v. Lynaugh, 879 F.2d 140, 148 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3295 (1989). In Buxton,
a state court judge had denied a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel by accepting
one of two conflicting affidavits, without holding an adversarial hearing. Judge Rubin
reasoned that the critical factual dispute required an adversarial hearing which is "informed
by the judge's observation of the witness' demeanor on direct and cross-examination."
Id. at 150. In Buxton, as in Wilson, Judge Rubin found more process appropriate only
because the decision-makers who preceded him had not even heard the evidence.
76. 825 F.2d at 882.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. See supra note 65.
82. After Roberts, Louisiana enacted a new death penalty law. It conditions the death
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prejudiced in its deliberations by considering the two invalid aggravating

factors.
Judge Rubin found Wilson's claim was foreclosed by the Fifth
Circuit's en banc decision in Williams v. Maggio 5 from which he had
dissented. In Williams, the court reasoned that the purpose of aggravating
factors under Louisiana law was to narrow the group of death eligible
defendants; an invalid factor would be immaterial to the jury's life-ordeath decision, as long as a valid factor was established. Judge Rubin

joined in Judge Randall's dissenting opinion which argued that the Fifth
Circuit should certify to the Louisiana Supreme Court the issue of
whether an invalid aggravating factor was prejudicial under Louisiana
law, 86 just as the United States Supreme Court had certified the parallel
question to the Georgia Supreme Court in Zant v. Stephens. 7
In Wilson I, Judge Rubin demonstrated his respect for precedent
and intellectual honesty. He not only rejected Wilson's claim based on

the decision in Williams from which he had dissented, but he analyzed
Louisiana law on the issue and concluded that the majority opinion in
Williams was correct. He found Louisiana law did not require a weighing
of mitigating and aggravating factors and thus an invalid aggravating
88
factor should not infect the deliberative process.
89
In Jones v. Butler, Judge Rubin was afforded an opportunity to
revisit the effect of an invalid aggravating factor under the Louisiana

death penalty law in light of the United States Supreme Court's inter-

vening decision in Johnson v. Mississippi." In Johnson, the Court held
that a Mississippi death sentence should be reversed when one of two
statutory aggravating factors was invalidated. Judge Rubin's intellectual
honesty and his own decision in Wilson compelled him to distinguish
Johnson. He found the Mississippi scheme "requires a jury to weigh
mitigating and aggravating circumstances while, as we have noted, Wilson

penalty upon the jury finding "at least one statutory aggravating circumstance exists and,
after consideration of any mitigating circumstances, recommendfing] that the sentence of
death be imposed." La. Code Crim. Proc. art. 905.3.
83. 813 F.2d 664 (Wilson I), modified on other grounds, 825 F.2d 879 (5th Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1079, 108 S. Ct. 1059 (1988).
84. The three factors were: (1) he committed the murder during an armed robbery;
(2) he committed the murder in an especially heinous manner; and (3) he had a significant
history of criminal activity. On direct appeal, the Louisiana Supreme Court found there
was no evidence that the murder was committed in a heinous manner and that the third
aggravating factor was unconstitutional. 813 F.2d at 673.
85. 679 F.2d 381 (5th Cir. 1982).
86. Id.at 405.
87. 462 U.S. 862, 103 S. Ct. 2733 (1983); Williams, 679 F.2d at 405.
88. 813 F.2d at 674.
89. 864 F.2d 348, 364, modified, 864 F.2d 368, 370-71 (5th Cir. 1988).
90. 486 U.S. 578, 108 S. Ct. 1981 (1988).
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held that Louisiana law does not." 91 In a weighing scheme, consideration
of an invalid aggravating factor would prejudice the jury; under Louisiana's scheme, in which the invalid aggravating factor is not necessarily
part of the weighing process, the prejudice is not as apparent. Ironically,
the state law issue, which the Fifth Circuit declined to certify in Williams
and Judge Rubin analyzed himself in Wilson, proved determinative in
Jones.92
VII.

CONCLUSION

Judge Rubin's death penalty opinions encompass a significant number of cases in which he affirmed the denial of relief to the condemned.
In many of those cases, his opinion was dictated by Supreme Court or
Fifth Circuit precedent, which he followed faithfully. In those cases in
which he either granted relief or argued in dissent for doing so, he
generally acted to vindicate the constituent elements of the judicial
process: an effective counsel, a sentencer who is not biased by misconceptions, and an adversarial process in which the defendant is not
mechanically foreclosed by his counsel's mistakes from raising fundamental constitutional claims.
Judge Rubin's death penalty opinions-dissents, concurring, and
majority-are a tribute to a great jurist. But the legacy is not one of
justice accomplished. As Judge Rubin noted in Riles, defendants are
routinely sent to their deaths only because their counsel was not competent. As the empirical evidence he recounted in King II demonstrates,
defendants are sentenced to die because juries believe falsely that otherwise they will be released on parole. As the decisions in Landry and
King II reflect, meritorious claims are not even heard solely because of
counsel's mistakes. Indeed, in the only two capital cases in which Judge
Rubin effectively granted relief, Mayo and Wilson, his decisions were
based in part upon fortuitous circumstances which surfaced only in
motions to reconsider and tilted the judicial balance. Twenty years after
Furman, arbitrariness in determining who lives and who dies remains
at the heart of capital sentencing.

91. 864 F.2d at 371.
92. Judge Rubin also addressed in Jones the logical extension of his interpretation
of Louisiana law: whether the Louisiana law was unconstitutional because it did not

provide for some weighing of mitigating and aggravating circumstances. Judge Rubin
upheld the law because, under the minimal constitutional principles recognized by the
Supreme Court, a state is not "required to adopt specific standards for instructing the
jury in its consideration of aggravating and mitigating circumstances." Id. at 367-68..
Significantly, the underlying basis of Judge Rubin's decision in Jones was later confirmed
by the United States Supreme Court in Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299, 110 S.
Ct. 1078 (1990).
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When a jurist of Judge Rubin's intellectual integrity is so often
constrained by precedent and relegated to dissent, there is cause to reexamine the precedents with which he so ably and fairly struggled:
Strickland and the inadequate counsel it tolerates; King II and the
misconceptions about parole which it sanctions; the procedural default
doctrine and its arbitrary barriers to review of constitutional violations.
Notwithstanding his recognized brilliance as a jurist, Judge Rubin was
never reluctant to reverse his own errors nor closed to the possibility
that he could be wrong. Only when the courts re-examine the role of
counsel and of the habeas process in death penalty cases, with the same
spirit of fairness and integrity which Judge Rubin exemplified, will Judge
Rubin's legacy be accorded its well-deserved place in the history of death
penalty jurisprudence.

